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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRESCRIPTION OF PROSECUTIONS-
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
In February 1958 the defendants were indicted for the crime
of conspiracy to commit public bribery. The defendants were
members of the New Orleans Police Department, a group of
gamblers, and intermediaries of the two groups. The conspiracy
allegedly occurred between January 1949 and June 1955. There
was evidence in the record that all of the defendants were men-
tioned or referred to in the Special Citizens Investigation Com-
mittee Report regarding public bribery, police bribery, and sys-
tematic graft, which was submitted to the grand jury in March
of 1954. All of the defendants pleaded one year prescription.'
On the trial of the pleas the previous district attorney testified
that the key evidence which made the indictment possible did not
come to his attention until August 1957. The district court sus-
tained the pleas of prescription. On appeal the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, held, affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to
sustain a finding that the offense charged was made known to
several judges, grand juries, and district attorneys more than
one year prior to the presentation of the indictment and that
prosecution was therefore barred by prescription. State v. Bag-
neris, 237 La. 21, 110 So.2d 123 (1959).
The common law has no prescriptive period for the bringing
of a criminal prosecution. 2 In many states, including Louisiana,
the most serious crimes are still held to be imprescriptible. 8 How-
l. "No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense, murder,
aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary,
armed robbey, and treason excepted, unless the indictment, information, or affi-
davit, for the same be found or filed within one year after the offense shall have
been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand jury having jurisdic-
tion .. " LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
2. LARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149-50, § 52 (2d ed. 1918); 15 AM. JuR.
-Criminal Law § 342 (1938), 22 C.J.S.-Criminal Law § 223 (1940), 16 C.J.
-Criminal Law § 340, n. 50 (1918).
3. In Louisiana the crimes of murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, and treason are impre-
scriptible. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 27:601 (1935);
ARIZ. CODE ANN. 44:1121 (1939); IDAHO CODE ANN. 19:401 (1947); MASS.
ANN. LAWS 277:63 (1933) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. 28:964 (1954) ; 22 OKLA. STAT.
ANN. 151 (1937) ; 19 PA. STAT. 211 (1930) ; 77 UTAH CODE ANN. 9.1 (1953) ;
Wis. R.S. 939.73 (1958). The generally accepted reason for this is that it is
socially undesirable to allow one who has committed one or more of the aggravated
types of offenses to escape prosecution merely because he had concealed his crime
for the length of the prescriptive period.
[426]
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ever, time limitations have generally been established by statute
for the bringing of charges for most offenses.4 The imposition
of a time limitation poses the problem of determining when that
period commences to run. Most state jurisdictions 5 and the
federal rules6 provide that the period begins with the commis-
sion of the offense. In the case of prosecutions for fines and
forfeitures Louisiana also follows this approach.7 As to the other
offenses, Louisiana originally had a period of limitation which
began with the commission of the offense,8 but in 1844 the leg-
islature provided that the prescriptive period would not begin
to run until the offense "shall be discovered or made known to
a public officer having power to direct the investigation or
prosecution." 9  This provision has remained essentially the
same,10 except that in 1928 the public officers whose knowledge
was essential were limited to the judge, district attorney, or
grand jury having jurisdiction." Under this "made known" test
the state must negative prescription where the indictment shows
that the charge was brought more than a year after the crime
was committed. 12 The defendant then bears the burden of af-
4. 15 AM. JuR.-Crminal Law § 342 (1938) ; 22 C.3.S.-Criminal Law § 224
(1940) ; 16 C.J.-Criminal Law §§ 340, 341, n. 55 (1918). For a comprehen-
sive treatment of the policy considerations behind the imposition of a time limita-
tion, see MODEL PENAL COnE § 1.07(2), comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
5. 15 AM. JuR.-Criminal Law § 345 (1938) ; 22 C.J.S.-Criminal Law § 226
(1940).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1948).
7. "Nor shall any person be prosecuted for any fine or forfeiture unless the
prosecution for the same shall be instituted within six months of the time of
incurring such fine or forfeiture ...... LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). Louisiana has
always followed this approach to fines and forfeitures (Crimes Act of 1805, § 37,
ch. 50), except for a short period between 1844 and 1855. See La. Acts 1844,
No. 122(3) ; La. R.S. 14 (1852) ; La. Acts 1855, No. 121(10).
8. "No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense, wilful
murder, arson, robbery, forgery and counterfeiting excepted, unless the indict-
ment or presentation for the same be found or exhibited within one year next
after the offence shall be done or committed. . . ." Crimes Act of 1805, § 37, ch.
50. 1
9. La. Acts 1844, No. 122(3). Georgia is the only other state that has the
made known test. "Nor shall any limitation run so long as the offender or
offense is unknown." GA. CODE ANN. 27:601 (1935).
10. La. Acts 1855, No. 121, § 10; La. R.S. 986 (1870) ; La. Acts 1894, No.
50; La. Acts 1898, No. 73; La. Acts 1926, No. 67; La. Acts 1928, No. 2, § 1,
art. 8; La. Acts 1.935 (2d E.S.) No. 21, § 1; La. Acts 1942, No. 147, § 1.
11. l.a. Acts 1928, No. 2, § 1, art. 8.
12. State v. Dooley, 223 La. 980, 67 So.2d 558 (1953) ; State v. Jones, 209
La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945); State v. Doucet, 205 La. 648, 17 So.2d 907
(1944); State v. Gehlbach, 205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349 (1944) ; State v. Guillot,
200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942) ; State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725
(1939) ; State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939) ; State v. Cheatham,
178 La. 366, 151 So. 623 (1933) ; State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 So. 631
(1925); State v. McNeal, 159 La. 386, 105 So. 381 (1925) ; State v. Drum-
mond, 132 La. 749, 61 So. 778 (1913) ; State v. Foley, 113 La. 206, 36 So. 940
(1904) ; State v. Hinton, 49 La. Ann. 1354, 22 So. 617 (1897) ; State v. Pierre,
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firmatively showing that a competent officer had knowledge of
the offense more than one year prior to the indictment." This
question of determining when an offense is made known is one
of fact which has proved most troublesome.
It is well settled that the competent officers must have knowl-
edge, actual or imputed,'14 of the commission of a crime or of-
tense.1 The court has held that the crime is "made known" to
an officer having jurisdiction when the facts which come to his
knowledge reasonably indicate that it is his official duty to act
or to see that an investigation of the alleged crime is instituted.1 6
It makes no difference that the official did not know the details
of the crime, or that the facts actually involved criminal liabil-
ity.i7 The fact that the state cannot prove the crime does not
prevent the commencement of prescription.' 8  Nor is prescrip-
tion affected by the non-action of the official, no matter what
his reason may be.' 9 However, the official must have informa-
49 La. Ann. 1.159, 22 So. 373 (1897) ; State v. Wren, 48 La. Ann. 803, 19 So.
745 (1896) ; State v. Davis, 44 La. Ann. 972, 11 So. 580 (1892) ; State v. Joseph,
40 La. Ann. 5, 3 So. 405 (1888); State v. Victor, 36 La. Ann. 978 (1884)
State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 255 (1852).
13. State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942); State v. Oliver, 196
La. 659, 199 So. 793 (1941) ; State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936) ;
State v. Perkins, 181 La. 907, 160 So. 789 (1935) ; State v. Keife, 165 La. 47,
115 So. 363 (1928) ; State v. Fuller, 164 La. 718, 114 So. 606 (1927) ; State v.
Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869 (1924); State v. Robinson, 37 La. Ann. 673
(1885); State v. Barfield, 36 La. Ann. 89 (1884) ; State v. Barrow, 31 La.
Ann. 691 (1879). Contra: State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1920),
followed by State v. Richard, 149 La. 568, 89 So. 697 (1921).
14. The Louisiana Supreme Court has refrained from using a literal inter-
pretation of the words "made known" and has said that proof must meet an objec-
tive rather than subjective standard. A literal interpretation of "made known"
would mean that which is a realized fact. Instead the court has chosen to interpret
the words "made known" as synonymous with the phrase "should have been known."
Of. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819 (1946) ; State v. Brocato, 205 La.
1019, 18 So.2d 602 (1944); State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793 (1940);
State v. Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940); State v. Perkins, 181 La.
907, 160 So. 789 (1935) ; State v. Cooley, 176 La. 448, 146 So. 19 (1933);
State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1926). By so doing the court has
said that prescription begins to run when competent officers have sufficient
knowledge to put them on inquiry, the officers then being chargeable with the
information and facts that such an inquiry would have revealed. This construc-
tion achieves a reasonable and practical result, for to demand proof of actual
knowledge would be extremely burdensome on the defendant.
15. Cf. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819 (1946) ; State v. Brocato,
205 La. 1019, 18 So.2d 602 (1944) ; State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793
(1940); State v. Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940); State v. Perkins,
181 La. 907, 160 So. 789 (1935) ; State v. Cooley, 176 La. 448, 146 So. 19
(1933) ; State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1926).
16. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819 (1946) ; State v. Brocato,
205 La. 1019, 18 So.2d 602 (1944) ; State v. Oliver 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793
(1940) ; State v. Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940); State v. Perkins,
181 La. 907, 160 So. 789 (1935).
17. State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1926).
18. State v. Perkins, 181 La. 907, 160 So. 789 (1935).
19. State v. Cooley, 176 La. 448, 146 So. 19 (1933).
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tion which reasonably indicates that the crime was committed
in his jurisdiction. 2°
An unsettled question in the Louisiana jurisprudence is
whether knowledge of the identity of the offender is necessary
to start prescription running. The statute refers only to knowl-
edge of the offense.2 1 In all cases decided under the 1928 Code
of Criminal Procedure the proper official had either actual or
constructive knowledge of the offender.22 In cases decided un-
der previously existing statutory provisions it would seem that
knowledge of the offender was a necessary element.23 It may
logically be assumed that the prior decisions are still controlling
since in essence the prior statutes differ from the present law
only as to the officers to whom knowledge must be imputed.2 4
Because Louisiana has the unusually short prescriptive period
of one year, it would seem that knowledge of the offender should
be a requisite. If the contrary were held, the criminal could
avoid prosecution by concealing his complicity in the offense for
a year after the crime was known. However, in such a situation
the state might preserve its cause of action by filing a "John
Doe" indictment.25 This in effect would give the state three ad-
ditional years to ferret out the offender.2 6
In the instant case the court did not discuss whether or not
competent officials had knowledge of the offenders. The court
seemed to affirm the view of the trial judge that only knowledge
of the offense was necessary to determine whether or not pre-
20. State v Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940).
21. "No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished . . . unless the indict-
ment, information, or affidavit for the same be found or filed within one year
after the offense shall have been made known to the judge, district attorney or
grand jury having jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
22. See note 13 supra.
23. See State v. Drummond, 132 La. 749, 61 So. 778 (1913) ; State v.
Touchet, 46 La. Ann. 827, 15 So. 390 (1894); State v. Hanks, 38 La. Ann.
468 (1886) ; State v. Barfield, 36 La. Ann. 89 (1884).
24. State v. Bussa, 176 La. 87, 145 So. 276 (1932), which was followed in
State v. Gehlbach, 205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349 (1944).
25. "In any indictment it is sufficient for the purpose of identifying the
accused to state his true name, to state the name, appellation or nickname by
which he has been or is known, to state a fictitious name, or to describe him
as a person whose name is unknown or to describe him in any other manner.
LA. R.S. 15:241 (1950).
26. "In felony cases when three years elapse from the date of finding an in-
dictment, or filing an information, and in all other cases when two years elapse
from the date of finding an indictment, or filing an information or affidavit, it
shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi if the accused
has not been tried, and if the district attorney fail or neglect to do so, the court
may on motion of the defendant or his attorney cause such nolle prosequi to be
entered the same as if entered by the district attorney ... ." LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
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scription had run.27 The court then applied the objective stand-
ard of the "made known" test and found that the proper officials
possessed knowledge of the offense more than one year prior
to the indictment. The instant case points up another procedural
weakness of Louisiana's prescriptive rules. The court has said
that the one year prescriptive period is sufficiently long to gath-
er evidence and to decide whether or not to prosecute. 28 In the
situation where both the offense and the offender are made
known to competent officials this may indeed be true. But this
is not because of the reasons advanced by the court. If at the
end of the one year period the state had filed an indictment, it
would have had the three year period in which trial should be
27. The trial judge in his opinion said: "Therefore, this Court concludes that
if this OFFENSE of conspiracy to commit public bribery was known either to
the Judge, District Attorney or Grand Jury for more than one year preceding
February 12, 1958, then the prosecution of the OFFENSE is prohibited by law.
The Court believes this to be the law regardless of the number of individuals
involved. Unless this is true there can be practically no prescription for the
crime of conspiracy-for this crime could be prosecuted any time in the distant
future by the alleged discovery of another conspirator. Thus the Court concludes
that if it finds that the OFFENSE here considered was known to any one of
the three authorities more than one year prior to February 12, 1958, then all
twenty-nine defendants must be freed.
"Also it must necessarily follow if the Court find that any of the authorities
knew that even one named conspirator conspired with parties unknown more
than one year prior to the finding of this indictment then the prosecution is pre-
cluded. This last statement is not to be construed to mean that this Court believes
the identity of any conspirator must be known by the proper authorities before
prescription begins to run-the law is positive that prescription begins to run
when the OFFENSE IS KNOWN-what the Court does mean that evidence
of the fact that authorities knew of a single individual engaged in a conspiracy
with unidentified parties would be sufficient proof of the inescapable conclusion
that the OFFENSE was known as of that time, and that regardless of how many
other conspirators were later uncovered, prescription be counted from the time
the OFFENSE was known." State v. Bagneris, No. 159-238, Section "B", Criminal
District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The Supreme Court in the instant case
posed the question to be decided as follows: "Have the defendants successfully
shown that the offense was made known to the Judge, District Attorney or Grand
Jury more than a year before the indictment was presented?" State v. Bagneris,
237 La. 21, 29, 110 So.2d 123, 126 (1959). The court then went on to say:
"The word offense may be and is frequently used interchangeably with the
word crime." Id. at 29, 110 So.2d at 126. Therefore it would seem that the court
has impliedly said that knowledge of the offender is not a necessary element to
start prescription running.
28 "The obvious purpose of this law was to require the prompt filing of
criminal prosecutions and to eliminate the fear by persons of the threat of prosecu-
tion by public officials charged with that duty more than one year after the
offense had been made known to them." State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 670, 199
So. 793, 797 (1940). "The right of an accused person to have the benefit of
the law of prescription is a substantial right, founded upon the most obvious of
reasons and upon a fundamental principle of justice. A year is a long time to
allow the judge or district attorney or a member of the grand jury having juris-
diction-and having knowledge of the commission of a crime-to make up his
mind that a prosecution should be instituted against the party accused or
suspected." (Emphasis added.) O'Neill's dissent in State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935,
958, 9 So.2d 235, 242 1942).
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brought 9 to continue to gather evidence to sustain a conviction.
Since, in this situation, the state, in effect, has four years to
secure evidence, there is no real reason to require the state to
becloud the reputation of a prospective defendant by filing an
early indictment based on inconclusive evidence of guilt. Since
an indictment should not be brought until there is sufficient evi-
dence to go to trial, this procedure would seem to be theoreti-
cally unsound. If knowledge of the offender is not a necessary
prerequisite, then the filing of the indictment against the wrong
person would not halt the running of the one year period. Thus
if this approach is adopted, the state could preserve its cause of
action by filing an indictment against the right person; but
would lose its action at the end of one year if brought against
the wrong party.
The "made known" test as interpreted in Louisiana has cre-
ated many problems of application and interpretation. The fact
that knowledge in each case must meet the test of an objective
standard encourages an endless stream of litigation establishing
at best a fine, wavery line. The American Law Institute and the
Federal Rules' approach to time limitation provides for a longer
period, running from the date of the commission of the crime,
for the bringing of the indictment, coupled with a shorter pe-
riod for bringing the defendant to trial.8 0 This rule in effect
will eliminate all of the troublesome problems of the "made
known" test. The only objection that can be made to the Ameri-
can Law Institute-Federal Rule is that of the possibility of con-
cealment of the crime for the length of the prescriptive period.
Since the basic purpose of the "made known" test is to give the
state a reasonable time in which to bring prosecutions of crimes
which are difficult to detect, it may be better to apply this prin-
ciple to those crimes that are extremely susceptible of conceal-
ment.3 1 However, as a general prescriptive concept, the "made
known" test is fraught with many difficulties. It is submitted
that the Louisiana State Law Institute is taking a step in the
29. See note 25 supra. In the instant case the prosecution could have preserved
its cause of action in this manner. Knowledge was obtained in March of 1954.
If the indictment would have been brought one year later the state would have
had until March of 1958 to file its indictment. The key evidence was obtained
in August of 1957. The subsequent indictment which was filed on February 12,
1958, would have still been within the prescriptive period.
30. Bennett, Revision of Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure--A Survte
of Some of the Problems, 18 LouISIANA LAW REviEw 383, 405 (1958).
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
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.right direction in its present plan to adopt the American Law
-Institute and Federal Rules' approach to time limitation. 2
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
-: PLEADING AND PRACTICE - THIRD PARTY PRACTICE -
JURISDICTION RATIONE PERSONAE
Plaintiff filed suit in Lafayette Parish against his automo-
bile insurer and the liability insurer of the party driving plain-
tiff's car at the time it was involved in an accident. Plaintiff's
insurer then filed a third party petition against the driver of
plaintiff's car, a resident of St. Mary Parish. The third party
defendant filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court
ratione personae which was sustained by the trial court. On
appeal, held, affirmed. "The third party practice act provides
no exception to the general rule that a defendant is entitled to
be sued in the Court of his domicile." Cameron v. Reserve Insur-
ance Company, 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d 336 (1959).
Prior to the adoption of the Third Party Practice Act, the
Louisiana equivalent of the Anglo-American third party action
was the call in warranty.' Article 384 of the Code of Practice,
in dealing with the call in warranty, provides an exception to
the general rule that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the
,court of his domicile :2 "The warrantor thus cited is bound to
appear before the court in which the principal demand has been
instituted, even when he resides out of its jurisdiction . .. ."a
The purpose of this exception to the general rule is to avoid a
multiplicity of actions. But for this rule the defendant in the
initial suit could recover only by filing a second suit in the domi-
cile of the warrantor and try essentially the same case he had
just finished defending.
32. Ibid.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282, 3288-3290 (1918).
1. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 379-388 (1870).
2. Id. art. 162: "It is a general rule in civil matters that one must be sued
before his own judge, that is to say, before the judge having jurisdiction over the
place where he has his domicile or residence, and shall not be permitted to elect
any other domicile or residence for the purpose of being sued, but this rule is
subject to those exceptions expressly provided for by law."
3. Id. art. 384. See also id. art. 165(4), which provides: "In matters relative
to warranty, they must be carried before the court having cognizance of the prin-
cipal action in which demands in warranty arise."
Jones v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 3 La. App. 85, 89 (1925) : "Under this
article [384] of the Code the fact that Miller [the warrantor] resides out of the
jurisdiction of the court does not relieve him of the duty to appear. He is bound
to appear, even though he resides out of the court's jurisdiction."
[Vol. XX
